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My topic is concerned less with the political and jurisdietional aspects
of the frontier than with people’s consciousness of it.’ Boundary is a term
whicli is much more familiar to anthropologists than frontier. As 1 shall
suggesú later, it conveys a less specific idea than ‘frontier’ —although
anthropologists differ in this respect considerably from other social
scientists. The proposition on which 1 wish to focus is that boundary is
essentially a matter of consciousness and of experience, rather than of fact
and law. Asan item of consciousness, it is inherent in people’s identity and
is a predicate of their culture.
Apart from ‘boundary’ itself, the title of the present chapter includes
within frs brief span two frequently abused words, ‘culture’ and ‘identity’.
1 shall attempt to be resolutely empirical. Without any semantie finesse, 1
shall treat identity as the way(s) in which a person is, or wishes tobe known
by certain others. ‘Culture as identity’ thus refers to the attempt to represent
the person or group in terms of a reified and/or emblematised culture. It is
a political exercise, manifest in those proeesses wbich we frequently describe
as ‘ethnic’, the components of which are referred to as ‘symbols’.
These are alí words which have some currency in ordinary language,
and whose academie and anthropological usage is thereby consíderably
complicated. In anthropology, ‘culture’ has gone through a succession of
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paradigm shifts. In the past it was used to suggest a determination of
behaviour. There was also a major school of thought which treated culture
as the means by which the supposedly discrete processes of social life, such
as polities, economies, religion, kinship, were integrated in a mannerwhich
made them alí logically consistent with each other. In this view, thc
individual became a mere replicate in miniature of the larger social and
cultural entity. The tendency now is to treat culture much more loosely
—as that which aggregates people and processes. rather than integrates
them. It is an important distinction for it implies diffcrence rather than
símilarity among people. Ihus, to talk about ‘a culture’, is not to postulate
a large number of people. alí of whom are merely clones of each other and
of some organising principie. That is important. for in ordinary 1 anguage.
the word is still used ah too frequently to imply this.
Moreover, if culture is not sai generis, exercising a determining power
over people, then it must be regarded as the product of sotnething cisc: if
not the logical replicate of other social processes —sav. relations of
production— then of social interaction itsclf. In this perspective, we have
cometo see culture as the outcome and product of interaction: or, to put it
anotber way, to see people as active in the crea/ion of culture, rather than
passive in receiving it. lf we are —in the contemporary jargon— the agenis
of culture’s creation, ihen it follows thai we can shape it to our will,
depending on how ingenious and poweríul we may be. And this. in the
matter of the politicisation of cultural identity. is another most significant
characteristie to which we will return.
Culture, in this view, is the means by which we make meaning, and witb
which sse make the world meaningful to ourselves. It is articulated by
symbols. Symbols are quite simply carriers of meaning. Tobe eflective. they
should be imprecise, in order that the largest possible number of people
can modulate a sbared symbol to their OWfl wills, to their own interpretive
requirements: a tightly-defined symbol is pretty useless as anything other
than a purely formal sign ICohen 1985: 183. Symbols are inherently
meaningless, they are not lexical; they do not have a truth value. liíey are
pragmatie devices which are invested with meaning through social process
of one kind or another. They are potent resources in the arenas of pohitics
and identity.
Culture, identity and symbolism alí converge on the concept of ethnicity.
In some respects. this is thc most difficult word of the three, since it appears
to mean someth i ng —indeed, lías been ini ported iii to lay usage. for this
reason— but. in practice. means either everything or nothing at ah. When
a British pol itician (ir policeman says ‘ethnic~. they mean ‘black’ or. at least,
‘different, ‘other’. When the spokespersons of ethnic organisations say
‘ethnic’. thev mean mínority, usually disadvantaged or discrirninated
mí non ty. Whe n the racial theori st says ‘ethnic’, he re fers to a relationsh i p
of blood and deseent. 1 f t he word is to be anthropologica lly useful, it can n ot
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refer exclusively to any of these. Ethnicity has become a mode of action
and of representation: it refers to a decision people make to depict
themselves or others symbolically as the bearers of a certain cultural
idenuity. The symbols used for Uds purpose are almost invariablymundane
items, drawn from everyday life, raiher than from elaborate ceremonial or
ritual occasions. Ethnicity has become the politicisation of culture [Paine
1984:212]. Thus, it is in part, a claim to a particular culture with alí tbat that
entails. But such claims are rarely neutral. The statement made in Ethiopia,
‘1 am Oromo’, or in Northern Ireland, ‘He’s a Prod’, are clearlynot merely
deseriptive: they have an added value, either negative or positive, depending
on who is speaking and to whom.
1 referred abose to the entailments of cultural claims. One aspect of the
charged nature of cultural identity is that in claiming one, you do not merely
associate yourself with a set of characteristies: you also dissociate yourself
from others. This is not to say that contrast is the conscious motivation for
such claims, as some writers have argued [egs.Barth 1969; Boon 1982]. but
it is implicit and is understood, the more so the more highly charged the
situation may be. Cultural identity also entails a patrimoine and a history,
or the acknowledged need to create these. It is in the expression of alí of
these entailments that the boundary, and especially the symbolic marking
of tl-ie boundary becomes crucial.
II the ethnic card is played in identity, it is not like announcing
nationality. Ethnicity is not a juridical matter, carrying legal rights and
obligations. It is a political claim. whieh entails political and moral rights
and obligations. 1 use the word ‘nationality’ rather than ‘nationhood’ since,
as we know, ‘nationhood’ may also be a statement of claim, and is one which
is often made to emphasise the eircumstances of its denia!. The putative
‘nationhood’ of Scotland. or of ‘the Jewish People’ or of the Basques, are
the axiomatie premises for claims: say fo nationality, orto the legitimacy of
lsrael’s occupation of so-called dudaea and Sumeria. But these are utterly
different from the argument made by Hong Kong Chinese regarding their
entitlement to a British passport; or from that of the Britisb government
concerning sovereignty and Gibralter or the Malvinas. The one, nationality.
is an argument about legal status. The other, nationhood, is a elaim about
the eharacter and integrity of one’s cultural identity. They may well coincide
in a process which L0fgren describes as ‘the nationalisation of culture’
[1989] in which attempts are made to forge a distinetive identity, for any of
a variety of strategic reasons. His example is the ereation of the national
syínbols and consciousness of ‘Swedishness’ in late l9th Century Sweden.
But there is much other contemporary anthropological work on this issue,
and the historian Peter Sahlins has ingeniously demonstrated the
modulation over time of local and national identity in the transnational
Pyrenees region of the Cerdagne (France)/Cerdanya (Spain) [Sahlins, 1989].
Now, the position has been taken in the past in anthropology that
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ethnicity — politicised cultural identity — was merely contrastive: that is,
that it is invoked only to draw a real or conceptual boundary between one
group and another. Ibis suggests that the boundary is situational — invoked
with respect to some groups and for some purposes, but not others. Ihis
does not sound much like ‘frontier’. This position. associated primarily with
Fredrik Barth, has dominated ethnicity studies for twenty five years. It
seems to me inherently unsatisfactory. Suifice it to say that in treating
ethnicity just as a ¡actical identity, it ignored both se/f-consciousness and
the syrnholic expression of ethnic identity. Ihe first suggests that an ethnic
identity means different things to those who participate in it; the second
directs us to the question of how ethnicity can have these infinitely variable
meanings while still retaining its coherent expression.
Ethnicity —the political expression of cultural identity— has two
distinetive registers to which we should attend. The first is used for the
apparently dogmatie statement of more or less objective doctrine: 1 am a
Palestinian” —and certain things will be understood as following from that.
Ihe second is for contentious statements which treat etbnicity as tbe context
of, or as an aspect of identity with very uncertain irnplications: “1 am a
particular Palestinian”. The apparently monolithic character of ethnic
identity at the collecrive level thus does not pre-empt the continual
reconstruction of ethnicity al Ihe personal level. Elhnicitv has a definite
appearance, but ratber indefinite substance.
[bis same discrimination of appearance from reality, of substance from
ínsubstantiality. is pertinent to the related idea of ‘boundary~. luis most
terms. the entitv whichtopical of or it expresses, seems to have preoccupied
the social sciences since the late 1 980’s and the collapse of the central
European state socialist empires. In the attempt to shed some conceptual
light on a categorical rnorass, the political scientist Malcolm Anderson
attempts to distinguish among ‘frontier, ‘boundary’ and ‘border’z:
‘Frontier is the word with the widest meaning... [u contemporary usage.
it can mean th e precise line at which j urisdictions meet, usuaíly
demarcated on the ground with posts. stones or fences and contrc>lled by
customs. police and military personn el. Frontier can also refer to a
region... Even more broadly. frontier is used in specific cases to refer to
the vast interior of a continent.. The term border can be applied to a
zone, usually a narrow one. or it can be thc line of demarcation... Fhe
word boundary is always used to refer to the 1 inc of del mi tation or
demarcationand is thus the narrowest of the (bree terms.’ (n.d.: 7, fn. 14).
His usage is similar to that proposed by Coakley:
dísm issal of the term ‘march as archa ic’ (referri ng to the ou ter hm its of a give n le-
rri tory) wi II not Sa t isfy ant h ropologis ts for whom it has bee n mode rn sed a tu the t roubíe—
sorne ‘margin Y
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‘Politicalgeographers conventionally distinguish between boundaries,
which have a precise, linear quality, and frontiers, which have more
diffuse. zonal connotations. The concept of frontier has a broader
soctal significance than the more restrictive legal concept of boundary’
(1982: 36).
The confusions among tbese words. alí of which express the condition
of contiguity, are those of ordinary usage rather than of science. It might
be helpful to think less in terms of discriminating among tliem on the
grounds of their putative referents —since ordinary language will not
honour such precísion— than in terms of how they are used and wbat they
are used for. In the discourse of anthropology,such ataxonomyofconcepts
and attitudes (rather than of concrete empirical referents) would suggest
almost the opposite of Anderson’s and Coakley’s surveys: that ‘boundary’
is the word with the most general application (since, in antbropology, is has
been used to signify sucb diverse tbings); whereas border seems situationally
specific. and frontier has come tobe reserved to fairly strictly limited geo-
political and legal applications. The distinction can be accomplisbed simply
by regarding frontiers and borders as matters of fact; whereas boundaries
are the subjects of claim based on a perception by at least one of the parties
of certain features which distinguish it from others. Whether it refers to a
collective condition, such as ethnic group identity, or to sometbing as
ephemeral as ‘personal space’, boundary suggests contestability, and is
predicated on consciousness of a diacritical property
There is a tendency among anthropologists (ant indeed, among other
social scientists who write about ethnicity) to credit the concept of boundary
to Barth’s seminal symposium, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (1969); and,
by implication, to associate it with etbnicity (or, as tbe subtitle of Barth’s
book put it. with the social organisation of cultural difference). But the
concept is really mucb more fundamental to the discipline and to the nature
of our enquiry. When anthropologists defined the subject as the study of
other cultures, they necessarily (if unwittingly) placed ‘boundary’ at the very
centre of their concerns. The relativism of anthropologist/anthropologised.
us/them, self/other, clearly implies boundary.
The problem became fixed as one inhering in tbe distance between
cultures ratber tban between minds. Anthropology has been preoceupied
with the boundaries between cultures. It has preferred to avoid the
boundaries between minds, between consciousnesses, either because these
have been regarded as too difficult to cross (cg. Needham 1981). or because
In her recent study of the annual festival in a Scottish Borders community, the geo-
grapher Susan Smith (1993) conflates alí three terms by making them expressive of ‘space
(a wo rd to whieh human geographers seem to resort nl uch as anthropologists do to ‘cultu-
re). While Ihere may be no intrinsie value in discriminating Ihe three words. there surely is
soníeth ng to be gained froin d st ingui shing the material froin the ideal.
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such a refocusing of enquiry would have subverted the disciplinary practice
of generalisation and its conceptual bases. This more fundamental problem
has been shoved aside simply by predicating consciousness on culture. which
15 ítself anthropologically constructed as being different from. and therefore
‘relative to’, other cultures.
One consequence of this has been that antbropologists bave been largely
content to assume the existence and integrity of collective boundaries.
Rather tban questioning tbeir existence, or questioning the extent to which
they might reasonably be generalised <vhose boundaries are they?) they
have been concerned almost exclusively with the ways in which boundaries
are marked. There have been significant theoretical debates concerning the
differences among tbe ways in wbicb they have done this, and concerning
the nature of the boundary marking devices and processes which they have
attributed to people. But tbere is little room for doubt that their concern
has not extended to the more fundamental question. It has been so central
an ethnographic preoccupation that examples would be somewhat
gratuitous, but to give just an idea of their range: it eould be found among
Leach’s ‘aesthetic frilís’. those non-technical aspeets of ritual which express
collective identity by emphasising cultural possession (see aboye). It was
explicitly at the heart of Schwartz’s depiction of the ~ethnognomomic’
activities of Admiralty lslanders (1975). It was strikingly and movingly
present in Eidheim’s famous account of the reaction of Norwegian Saami
to the stigma tbey supposedly perceived as attacbing to them (1969); and
provided the material for the reformulation of migrant West Indian
identities among the Notting Hill carnival participants described by Abner
Cohen (1980; 4992).
So ubiquitous has this kind of work been, especially in studies of ethnicity
and social identity, that wc base taken for granted the integrity of its central
concerns: to sbow bow individuals are constructed in tbe images of their
collective representations. It has imputed boundary-consciousness to people
without pausing to enquire quite what it is that they are supposed to be
conscious of. Wbat is the individual conscious of when she or he invokes a
boundary as a means or source of social identity? Culture and consciousness
are not alternative modalities: culture only exists as consciousness. In the
etbnographic literature, people base been constructed in terms of putative
boundaries (localities), and in terms of anthropologists’ consciousness of
boundaries, without adequately interrogating tbese notions.
The terms ‘frontier’ and ‘border’ (and boundary, if it is not distinguished
from them)alcrts ustolines which mark th&extentofcorrtiguoussocictíes
or to meeting points between supposedly discrete social groups. Wc bave
barely glanced at those more amorphous divisions which appear routinely,
notjust between cultures nor even within tbem, but between intimales who
share culture. As 1 have suggested, we base shied away from, base even
denied any interest in, the boundedness of tbe mmd. the liniits of
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consciousness which separate one self from another. We have excused
ourselves from such an enquiry on the grounds that it would be too difficult,
and that our concept of culture enables us to invent people who are similar
to each other. Instead of dealing witb the individual, we have restrained
our ambition and addressed ourselves instead to whole societies or to
substantial parts of them. Yet, looking at individual’s boundary
transformations should alert us to the qualitative nature of collective
boundaries.
1 will try to illustrate tbis briefly witb reference to rituals of initiation.
In dealing with ritualised status passage, we do not seem commonly to have
explicitly applied the concept of boundary to divisions between statuses,
but there is no reason why we should not do so. Wc have the evocative
notion of liminality to describe [he blurriness of transformation, and the
acute consciousness of status on either side of it. This is not unlike the
exaggerated concern with social identity to be found commonly in geo-
political borderlands (eg. Sahlins, 1989; Brown, 1990), and to which 1 shall
return. Rut the difficulties of passing from status to status seem curiously
understated in ethnographic aceounts — as if such adjustments were as
unambiguous as (albeit more troublesome than) crossing a national border:
one moment you are in Italy, the next in France. The worst you are Iikely
to suffer isa brief spell in no-man’s land.So it is with accounts of initiation.
One day the initiate isa child; the next he or she is initiated and, alter due
process of seclusion, re-emerges into society bearing the new status of adult.
or initiated youth, or marriageable girí. The confusion of liminality, the
blurriness of being ‘betwixt and between’, or being in the social equivalent
of no-man’s land, is somehow confined temporally by the ritual process and
spatially to the initiates’ lodge. It is ended by the next ritual phase of re-
aggregation. This seems hardly plausible to me. Transformations of status,
like crossing geo-political borders, require a process of adjustment, of
rethinking, which goes beyond the didactie procedures about which we base
been told so much. They require a reformulation of self which is more
fundamental than admission to items of lore, or being loaded with new rights
and obligations. [‘he difficulties inherent in such self-adjustment may vary
according to the nature of the frontiers which are crossed; but our
experience of polities and travel should also alert us to tbe deceptively
innocuous character of crossing between supposedly proximate statuses or
cultures. The first intimation to us that we are really in a different place may
be the look of incomprehension on the faces of our interlocutors, or the
pained censure by others of our newly inappropriate behaviour. Having
crossed a boundary, we have to think ourselves into our transformed identity
which is far more subtle, far more individualised than its predication on
status.
A boundary-cross¡n g stimulates the awareness of a person as un
indiv,dual, as someone who can step back and reflect on bis or her position
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with respect to society. If we recognise boundaries as matters of
consciousness rather than of institutional dictation, we see them as much
more amorphous, much more ambiguous than we otherwise have done. It
may be this very ambiguity which inclines societies to invest their various
boundaries so heavily with symbolism. The contributors to my symposium,
Symbolising Boandaries, alí describe such processes of marking in
the undramatie circumstances of the British Isles, whether dealing with the
imagery of suburban Manchester or with adolescence in rural
Northumberland (1986). As a matter of ideology, the boundary may be
given dogmatie form. But its internalisation in the eonscíousness of
individuals renders it much less definitely. 1 think perhaps this offers us a
clue to the discrimination of boundary, border and frontier. Border and
frontier have the quality of finity, definity, about them. When they are
crossed, one has definitely moved from the Cerdagne to Cerdanya. That is
undeniable, for my passport stamp telís me so. What is much less certain is
what this crossing-point means to those who live on either side of it. The
uncertainty may be glossed by language, currency, by law, lore and by alí
the iconography of custom and tradition. But,when alí this is said and done,
it remains a gloss on the much more ambiguous boundaries of consciousness.
Borders and frontiers seem to me to have something in common with the
taxonomie absoluteness of anthropological categories: boundaries, with the
blurriness and elusiveness of symbols.
Of course it follows that if one does not know quite what it is that has
been crossed, then one may also be unaware that a boundary has been
crossed at ah. 1 share with my adopted countryfolk an intolerant dismay at
the insensitivity of many incoming English people to the notion that in
Scotland they are actually in a different place. No doubt we ahí have
examples from our fíehd experience of people who fahí over their idiomatie
fect because of their cultural boundary errors, and this kind of insensitivity
or clumsiness is also readihy observable among those crossing unfamiliar
status boundaries. Again, the examples are legion and perhaps do not need
to be cited to make the elementary proposition that, as objective referents
of meaning (as opposed to pohitical legitimacy) boundaries are essentialhy
contestable, while borders are not.
In an intriguing examination of Canadian fiction writing, Russehl Brown
has showed how central the border is to Canadian identity. Actuahly, his
claim is more ambitious: ‘[T]he border is central to Canada’s selJ~awareness
(1990: 32). Without wishing tobe pedantie, 1 find difficulties in this claim:
countries are not self-aware; people are. If he is saying that the border is
significant in individuals’ awareness of themselves as being Canadian, that
is fine. Rut if he is saying that in so faras individuals are aware of themselves
it is as Canadians because the border looms so large, 1 wouhd have to regard
this with some scepticism; and as a faihure to appreciate the eomplexity of
self-identity. He points to the ubiquity of oppositions as a themein Canadian
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literature, but it does not need a structuralist to point out that there is
nothing peculiarly Canadian about this. Any anthropologist with experience
of peripheral societies, or of societies in which boundaries are heavily
invested symbohically, wouhd base made similar observations — but not
because of the border: the border isa social fact. Whether ornot it signifies
difference is a matter of social construction, and is more properly thought
of as one of boundary. If border is fact, boundary is consciousness, and the
difference between them is crucial. 1 suggest a distinetion the significance
of which lean only assert but not demonstrate. There isa difference between
being conscious of what is on either side of a border, and being preoccupied
with the boundary as sucli. The first, again, implies definity: if 1 go this way.
¡ will be X; if 1 go that way, Y. The latter seems to me more authenticahly
boundary-conscious: liminal, uncertain, unpredictable.
It is this kind of uncertainty which drives people to grasp for certainty,
and which in turn motivates identity. Ihis may be formulated around a
collective stereotype or dogma, such as ‘Canada’s self-awareness’. Or, it
may proceed the other way around, by assimilating such cultural products
to sehf-experience. Writing with respect to the Cerdagne/Cerdanya border,
and fohlowing Benedict Anderson, Sahlins says that national identity,
appeared less as a resuht of statc intentions thanfrom the local process
of adopting and appropriating the nation without abandoning local
interests, a local sense of place, or a local identity (1989: 9. See also
ibid.: 269-70).
Historically. anthropology has privileged the collective and dogmatie
and neglected the individual and experiential, as a consequence of its
general neglect of selfhood and self-consciousness. It is a neglect which
requires repair if we are reahly to get to grips with the meanings of
boundaries.
II
lf we return to ethnicity, we wihh find that a focus on boundary-
consciousness will sensitise us to the kinds of circumstance in which ethnic
identity becomes salient, in whicli people’s consciousness of themsehves as
ethnic becomes prominent. The minimal conditions are that people
recognise that ignorance of their culture among others acts to their
detriment; that they experience the marginalisation of their culture, and
their relative powerlessness with respect to the marginalisers [Cohen 1975].
With ignorance of a culture goes the denial of its integrity. Because
culture is expressed symbolically, and thus has no fixed meanings, it is often
invisible to others, especiahly to powerfuh others. This denial of, or threat
tu cultural intcgrity is experienced by people in ahí manner of ways: through
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the subordination of indigenous languages — say. Tamil to Sinhala; Breton
to French; Catalan and Gallego to Spanish: Welsh and Gaelie (like Frencb,
among Quebecois) to English: through the denigration of their tradition
(Ihe examples ate almosí limitless — Australian Aborigines; Mongolian
Buryats; Basques); and from the outright denial of their distinctiveness —
say, Armenians and most other nationalities in the former Soviet Union,
sectarian groups in South Asia, and so on.
It does happen. has happened historically on a massive seale, that such
continuous denigration seems to drive people into cultural retreat where
they either make their tradition a covert matter. or appear to desert it in
large measure. But the historical era in which this retreatist stance prevailed
came toan end emphatically during the later 1 960s, and was replaced by an
assertive stance in which the putative stigma of cultural inferiority was
transformed into an emblem of its superiority.
So, from the experiential point of view. the politicisation of cultural
identity requires people to react against their own felt disadvantage and
denigration, as well as occurring in characteristie economie and political
ci rcumstances.
Ethnicity is also a matter of historical genre. and we find ourselves now
in the very middlc of its often grim apotheosis. The process of decolonisation
appears to have no objective end to it: its logie is to continue the process
to a kind of infinite federalism. Pierre van den Berghe describes ethnicity
in the industrialised world as. “the last phase of imperial disintegration’.
He asks, ‘if the Fiji lslands can be independent. why not Scotland?” [van
den Berghe 1976]. If Sri Lanka, why not a Taniil state within the island: if
Ethiopia, why not Eritrea (again)? And so on. Almost everywhere one
turns, there is being played out an epie struggle for recognition. for the
acknowledgement of rights, abose alí, br the acknowledgement of cultural
integrity. expressed now in terms of nationhood. even of statehood.
Nationalism now seems more a matter of ieonicity than of political economy;
and as sueh, is being pressed by nationalist activists onto the consciousnesses
of ethnic group members. In this militant mode, there is the attempt to bring
people’s boundary consciousness into alignment with putative political
frontiers.
The imperative need to posit culture as identity, and, increasingly, as
ethnicised national identity, can arise from many different circumstances.
¡ have mentioned earlier those of a perception of imminent and possibly
cataclysmic crisis: and of the attempt to reverse extreme disadvantage. It
appears also when there is a perceived threat to the distinctiveness of a
group through its assimilation or the blurring of its boundaries, or as the
consequence of internal differentiation or disagreement. One finds then a
politicisation of culture or traclition or whatever putative dogma provides
the raisort detre of the group. ¡lic cali for a jihad to unite nations against
a common enemy, in order to mask the internecine nature of dispute among
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them; the spurious elevation of Zionism to the status of religious obligation;
and the ‘metaphorisation’ of culture as a response to such historical
circumstances as demographic and economie change, secularisation,
integration and vulnerability to new kinds of information.
Etbnicity, nationhood, ‘peoplehood’, came tobe contrived using symbols
whieh can be made by individuals to mean anything, to enconipass widely
varying kinds of personal experience and material conditions. It would be
an unjustifiable generalisation to eonstrue as cynical these representations
of identity in somewhat contrived cultural terms: their expression and use
may well speak rather of a commitment to the integrity of culture andgroup.
In these cases, it is only by making the culture visible, so to speak, that its
bearers can gain some awareness of what they have to defend, and those to
whom it is vulnerable can be made aware of what they might otherwise
damage, unwittingly or deliberately. So far as indigenes are concerned, the
iconísation of culture may be no more than a means of agreeing on a very
limited number and range of symbols as a kind of lowest common
denominator. whieh can be interpreted and rendered privately by each of
them in ways to suit themselves. Apparent uniformity in the terms of publie
discourse glosses over an uncountable multitude of divergencesof meaning.
But for outsiders, it is a caution against their cultural blindness.
For example, the tradition of the Fourth World peoples frequently refers
to their incomparably expert use of the land, as either hunters and gatherers,
oras pastoralists, which was based on their expert knowledge, and attitudes
to the land, both of which are peculiar to the people themselves and are not
accessible to outsiders. The reason is quite simple: outsiderscannot see the
land in the same way; and, therefore, they cannot know what they are
looking at. The cultural boundedness of Australian Aboriginal perception
has been amply documented both in ethnography and in fiction. The
stereotypical insensitivity of the white to Aboriginal sacred places may be
a consequence of contempt in some cases; but is certainly the result of
cultural blindness in most. To us a stone is a stone; to the Aboriginal, it
conecais an ancestor. Another celebrated example is the blindness of
Canadian government seientists to tlie superior indigenous expertise of
Mistassini-Cree lndians in Quebee in monitoring the environment, an
expertise underpinned by their cultural rights and obligations with respect
to the use and stewardship of land.
Wherever one sees this kind of struggle — whether in Norwegian
Saamiland; in the Torres Straits Islands; among Kayapó lndians; in South
Asian ‘communalism’ or in Southern Africa—— there seems tobe an almost
irresistible inclination to explain behaviour by treating itas tbe producí of
culture: the Zulus or Yanomamo are said tobe warlike or aggressive; some
other society might be spoken of as constrained in its thought and action
by its cosmology or its kinship system or whatever. There isa fundamental
confusion here between culture as a body of substantive fact (which it is
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not) and as a body of symbolic form which provides means of expression
but does not dictate what is expressed or the meaning of what is expresscd.
In this respect, culture is insubstantial: searching for it is like chasing
shadows. It is not so much that it does not exist, as that it has no ontology:
it does not exist apart from what people are conscious of, apart from what
they do, and therelore what people do cannot be explained as its product.
Culture can be invoked as a means of rcpresenting them — as, for example.
when it is deployed as identity. But in those circumstances it must be
regarded in the same way as any other symbolic expression: as being
inherently tneaningless. but capable of substantiation at the discretion of
those who use it — multireferential, multivocal, an infinitely variable tool.
It is Ihe consequent diversity of meaning which requires us to make a clear
distinetion betwecn boundaries in people’s consciousness, and the legal
representation of their distinetion from others through borders or frontiers.
It does not matter wliether we use the political scientists’ and
geographers’ taxonomies of border concepts or our own, so long as we do
make the distinetion between barriers in jurisdictional fact and in the mmd.
Wc must do this in order not to falí prey to thc comfortable assurnption that
the nationalities on either side of an international dividing line are co-
extens~ve with discrete cultures whieh themselves dominate and are
replicated through the behaviour of individuals. The meaning of the division
is to be sought in the consciousness of those wbo are oriented to it, not
in some abstracted collectivity. Unless we recognise the power and
persuasiveness of such boundary consciousness. we cannot begin to
understand the attraction to people of ethnicity. nationhood or any other
collectivity which claims distinctiveness for itself.
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